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I

INTRODUCTION
Borders are much more than s i mp l e e dges . Ra t h e r, they encompass
physical, cultural, social, and economic spaces that expand and contract
along the physical line of the bor de r. Instead of border s , we mus t re cognize borderlands, which encompass the geography of border culture and
economy. I Here we use borderlands to refer not only to the southwestern
border states of the United States, but also to the states of Baja Calif ornia, Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, and the other drug production
areas of the Republic of Mexico, as well as some of the major drug trafficking impact areas within the United States, for these are the economic spaces
affected by our adjacent boundaries and the areas affected by drug trafficking in the borderlands.
In this paper we examine the effects of this drug trafficking
contrabandista activity, the rise and decline of Mexico's leadership as
an exporter of illicit drugs, and some of the effects of organized trafficking on the political economy of both Mexico and the United States. Smuggling and contraband are endemic to borderlands. As one knowledgeable observer
estimated, "anywhere from 20 percent to 30 percent of all economic activity
along our Southwestern border is illegal contraband.,,2 Of this contraband
trade only a small percentage involves the smuggling of illegal drugs .
Most of it involves the illegal rebalancing of border-created supply-anddemand inefficiencies. Coffee, instant cocoa, parrots, vehicles, appliances, human labor , mercury, guns, or drugs make up the traffic, and whatever is expensive in one nation and cheap in another pr ovide the incentive
to the contrabandista. Like many kinds of crime and criminal activity,
smuggling is functional and helps satisfy larger systemic needs.
While the potential for such activity is natural to borderlands, it
is more likely to occur when economic differences in adjacent cultures are
great. The United States-Mex ico border separates the greatest per capita
income differences between two adjacent countries in the world; thus it is
only natural that contraband, smuggling, and its attendant crime, corruption, and human exploitation would be common to this borderland . 3 What is
surprising is that this subject is only rarely mentioned, much less systematically studied, by scholars interested in the borderlands. This paper

is an attempt at correcting this situation, and will, it is hoped, mark
the beginning of a series of long-term studies of contraband and the
contrabandista, as well as the ramifications of this activity for both
Mexico and the United States. Much work needs to be done, better statistics and data bases gathered, and long-term funding support for this type
of r esearch developed. We hope this paper can help point up these issues,
the problems, and the importance of continuing and improving our research
in this area.
Here we examine one of the most publicized and more studied of the
border contraband crime matrices, the trafficking in heroin. We focus on
this contraband activity and its ramifications first because we are familiar with it. We have spent the last several years researching and studying
organized drug trafficking in New Mexico. 4 Second, because we believe that
before one sets out to examine the less known and untidy world of the
contrabandista, one should first study the more visible and known world;
and much data has been collected, if not analyzed, on heroin traffic.
Third, in keeping with a prudent approach, we believe that before entering
int o what could be a most dangerous game , it is wise to study the terrain
from some dis tance . This we have done from the sanctuary of secondary
analy s i s . We know there are mi les to t r avel; we hav e, howev e r, s ou gh t t o
take a first step .

II

UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDERLANDS DRUG TRAFFICKING TRENDS:
PAST TO PRESENT
The 1,94S mile border between the United States and the Republic of
Mexico has long been an area of drug trafficking and smuggling. In the
nineteenth century, the Chinese communities in Mexico and the United
States engaged in the production of opium in Mexico for use in Los Angeles
and San Francisco. S The Los Angeles-Tijuana link was further developed in
this century after the passage of legislation limiting the open sale of
narcotic drugs and medicines. But for the most part, our Southwestern
borderlands before World War II lacked the people, money, leisure, or attitude to make it much of a market for illicit drugs. While there were
local addicts and indigenous users, these tended to be few in number and
underground in life- style . The prime market was Los Angeles, and the 6
Tijuana-Sinaloa connection appeared to be only major trafficking axis.
The rest of the borderlands had their minor traffickers and user-entrepreneurs loosely 1inked--often through kinship ties--to producer communities in Mexico, but this border traffic was largely unorganized, with
half-ounce and ounce shipments constituting the bulk of the trade. Such
small-scale enterprise is economically and risk efficient in the borderlands. One important structural point to remember is that the further one
gets from the border, the greater the need for organization and the trafficking in larger unit$ of illicit drugs. This fact changes both the
nature of the enterprise and any interdiction strategies or public policy
alternatives.
It was nuring World War II, with the allies cut off from other legal
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sources of drug supplies by the fighting, that Mexico became a source
of morphine for the licit market and of heroin for the illicit. Similarly , t he war created a need for hemp for rope and cordage, which led
to the large-scale cultivation of marijuana both in Mexico and the
United States . 7 After the war, such cultivation appears to have declined, and it was not until the "epidemic" of drug use in the 1960s
that border states, and later the federal government, began to take
cognizance of the role and potential of Mexico in the total drug
trafficking picture. In May of 1969 the California legislature first
noted the "fire storm" of drug use in the state. 8 In the rest of the
southwestern borderlands it was still considered a minor indigenous
problem by most federal agencies.
The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in their 1970
budget hearings with Congress, for example, noted : "Heroin from
Mex ico is not considered a major problem. New York City is the key
point of entry for heroin distribution throughout the United States.,,9
Mex ico was considered by BNDD that year, however , to be a major source
of barbiturates and amphetamines a s we ll a s the source of large amounts
of marijuana smug g l ed i n to t he Un ited States. An examination of U.S .
Customs data from the San Ysidro-Tijuana border from the 1960s (Table 1)
See Table One
suggests that BNDD may have been missing some early signs that things
were beginning to change.
While drug statistics and seizure data must always be examined with
caution, it is the pattern, not the specific numbers, that are of interest
here . By the end of the period, drug trafficking in all common types was
substantially on the increase. We also would note that in 1967 the
U. S. Customs Service at the San Ysidro station estimated that they were
only seizing some 4% or 5% of the drugs being smuggled across. lO
Elsewhere in the southwestern borderlands in 1968-1969, the BNDD
found only minor drug trafficking from Mexico. In Texas, they noted,
"only gram and ounce traffic by independent smugglers carrying small
amounts. "11 In Arizona and New Mexico, they found, "capsule (gram)
amounts of heroin .. • (with) none of the traffickers supported by organized crime . "12 In these areas of the border BNDD also found that even
the marijuana was mostly "domestic and homegrown."13
On the other side of the border there appeared, throughout this
period, to be greater concern . The so-called "gran campana" against the
cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana was launched by the Mexican
government in 1948.14 But this effort consisted of only occasional raids
on fields in Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua, and Guerrero . Richard Craig,
a student of this period, notes that it was not until 1961-1962, after
acquiring some $500,000 in surplus U.S. aircraft, helicopters, jeeps,
wagons, and spare parts, that some 3,890,316 square meters (961 acres)
of drug cultigens were destroyed . lS The major effect of these raids
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appears to have been the displacement of these fields and their relocation
in more mountainous terrain .
•.• opium and mar~Juana cultivators, aware of the increased
probability of aerial detection , began concealing their
crops amidst legitimate ones and planting smaller crops in
even more remote regions. 16
BNDD in Mexico, working with the Mexican government, did not find much
in the way of major heroin production or trafficking; they did, however,
begin to find marijuana for export on the increase in 1968-1969.
July 26, 1968. Guadalarjara, Mexico. 7 lbs. heroin;
2,2 lbs. opium gum; 17 lbs. marijuana seized. The
defendants are considered to be the biggest suppliers
of opium in Michoacan State.
November 13, 1968. Playa Azul, Michoacan, Mexico.
4 , 000 lbs . bricked marijuana seized.
November 19, 1968. Playa Azul, Michoacan, Mex ico.
6,000 lbs. bricked marijuana seized. (3/4th miles
from site of first seizure.)
November 10, 1969. Guamuchil, Sinaloa, Mexico.
6.6 lbs. heroin seized. 17
lbs.

In a sixteen-month period from 196~ to 1969 BNDD seized a total of 13.6
(6.8 kilos) of heroin in Mexico. l

In 1969, however, the United States government in a dramatic policy
shift entitled "Operation Intercept" attempted to halt drug trafficking by
the simple expedient of stopping everyone crossing the border. This operation, better termed "Operation Fiasco," tied up border traffic, angered
the Mexico government, and found little marijuana or heroin in its eight
weeks of operation. 19 Secretary of State , Henry Kissinger, later argued
that the purpose of Operation Intercept was not to seize drugs, but to convince the Mexican government to pay greater attention to drug production
within its borders. The State Department, at that time, and scholarly
analysis later disputes this reasoning. But with increased aid to Mexico,
greater cooperation, and technical assistance to Mexico's "La Campana
Permanente" the joint U.S.-Mexican effort to eradicate opium poppy and
marijuana was begun. 20
Not until 1972, however, with the breaking of the "French Connection,"
did the heroin market structures and distribution patterns radically shift,"
and Mexican drug trafficking and opium poppy fields blossom. Mexican "mud,"
brown heroin, was suddenly in great demand. From 1972 through 1976 Mexico
reigned as "queen" of the heroin trade and the leader in supplying an ever
increasing demand for marijuana. By 1977 and 1978 , however, the impact of
the cooperative Mexican-United States efforts to locate and eradicate opium
poppy field and marijuana pastures , and the TRIZO and JANUS programs that
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this cooperation spawned, was beginning to be seen. These programs, as well
as a declining demand for heroin (as purity declined to almost zero because
of improved interdiction and prosecution of major traffickers), preference
and traf f icking shifts to Colombian marijuana and cocaine, and the Paraquat
spraying p ro~Iam, all lessened demand for Mexican heroin and marijuana in the
U. S . market.
By summer 1978 trends could be clearly seen that Colombia had displaced
Mexico as the major supplier of the American drug demand. Cocaine and
Colombian marijuana were the drugs of choice. The penalties for cocaine or
marijuana smuggling are much milder than those for heroin, thus lowering
risk/penalty ratios for volume trafficking in these drugs. Tremendous profits and new middle-class demand also helped make this shift attractive.
Today Colombia is first in this illicit drug market. Along with these
changes, the success of the U.S.-Mexican programs has affected Mexico's
leading position as a heroin producer. Now as overdose deaths indicate,
Asian "Golden Triangle, " Pakistani, and Iranian white heroin appears to
have taken an increasing share of the market away from Mexican trafficking
organi za tions. Table 2 provides one illustration of t h ese shifts . Indeed ,
impressionistic data sugges t that the Colombian traffic is even affecting
See Table Two
Mex ico ' s natural dominance in the drug markets of the borderlands .
The vast profits to be made from trafficking during the heyday of
Mex ico's leadership in poppy and marijuana production led to the development of a number of sophisticated organized criminal groups and trafficking
structures. Major crime families operated in Ciudad Culiacan in Sinaloa
State, and in Durango State . The Durango or Herrera Organization was considered by the Drug Enforcement Administration to represent the single most
important group. Other families among the six major trafficking organizations
are of almost equal importance, wealth and influence, but the Herrera "Family"
is typical of them and illustrates the structure and operation of Mexican
drug trafficking groups and their impact on both sides of the border.

III

THE STRUCTURE AND ECONOMICS
OF THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION:
THE DURANGO-CHICAGO CONNECTION
The Herrera "family" is said to have been in the heroin trafficking
business since 1957. 23 While their home base is Los Herreras in Durango,
Mexico, members of the Herrera group have been living in the Chicago area
since the 1950s. It was not until May 1972, however, that the Herreras
were specifically mentioned as being large-scale traffickers. In that
month the "Noche. y Dia" Club, owned by Asuncion Herrera-Chavez, and " El
Alacran" Club, run by Reyes Herrera-Berrera and his three sons, were cited
by the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement as being major trafficking
headquarters. 24 It is likely that the Herreras were well-established by that
date, although at the time the Chicago Police were not yet knowledgeable
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about Mexican "brown" heroin. Indeed, a year later, two officers stopped
and released a young Mexican national in the vicinity of these two clubs
after accepting his story that the brown soil-like substance filling a
suitcas e i n his car was Mexican "fertilizer.,,2S By 1978, however, both
local and federal law enforcement were well acquainted with the Herrera
organization and what the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission
called the "Heroin Highway" stretching from Durango to Chicago.
To students of illicit organizations and their operations, as well
as to borderlands scholars, the Herreras' heroin trafficking operations
provide fascinating material for study. The Herreras are in all likelihood the premier "contrabandistas" of the United States-Mexico borderlands. The DEA considers them the largest single heroin supplier organization in Mexico, estimating their profits at $100,000,000 a year. 26 Such
net profit would place the Herrera group about l16th in the Fortune magazine
listing of America's most profitable corporations, and ninth , just behind
Safeway Stores , in profit earned by U.S. retailers. 27 To students of
border issues perhaps the most fascinating thing about the Herrera organizat ion is that the vast majority of this profit is returned to the Republic
of Mexico.
The base of the Herrera organization 1 s operations is Durango State,
Mex ico: in the capital, Durango, where Jaime Herrera-Nevarez lived for
many years, and where his associate Enrique Diaz-Garcia owns an illicit
heroin processing laboratory; up the secondary highway, Durango 89, past
Los Herreras , the family stronghold where Arnoldo Herrera- Herrera owns a
heroin laboratory ; and on to Tepehuanes, some two hundred kilometers
Northwest of the capital city, where Manuel Herrera-Herrera controls a
seasonal heroin laboratory; Durango State is Herrera country. In the
summer of 1978 Jaime Herrera-Nevarez moved south to the Zacatecas-Guadalajara
area, where his long-time friend and partner , Manuel Villareal-Valdez, resides. 28 A Herrera cousin, Carlos Herrera-Araluce is Mayor of Gomez Palacio
in East-cen al Durango State and said to run a heroin-processing laboratory there.
Another cousin of the Herreras is a police official in
Hidalgo del Parral in southern Chihuahua State and is said to facilitate
Herrera interests from there. The Herreras' influence and investments
are felt across all North Central and Western Mexico, but as one DEA agent
noted, Durango is their corporate headquarters.

1g

The Herreras control the City of Durango in the same
manner that American corporations have controlled company
towns in the United States. 30
In organizational structure and style, the Herrera group is rather
similar to Italian-American organized crime groups operating in the United
States during Prohibition. The approximately 2,000 members of the " family"
are all of the same ethnic group and come from a particular geographic area
of their country of origin. They are related either directly by blood ties
and kinship, or through the cross-ties of marriage. As did the old ItalianAmerican organized crime leadership, they tend to live relatively modestly
in both Mexico and in the United States. As did the old Italian groups
they tend to send their money, or some portion of it, home, and they seek
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respite there, as well as sanctuary from American law enforcement.
Structurally, the Herrera organization consists of six interrelated
families. The senior members of these families (Jaime Herrera-Nevarez,
Manuel and Arnoldo Herrera-Herrera, Heliodora Herrera-Medina, and Luis
Herrera-Vengas) are responsible for overseeing the organizational tasks of
production and processing as well as the management and investment of capital.
These organizational tasks include the hiring of campesino farmers, the distribution of poppy seed, the development of new production areas, the oversight of habitad6res, who collect the opium gum, the supervision and management of the laboratories, and the "stepping on" (Le., cutting and diluting),
packaging, and shipment of the heroin to Chicago. 31 While the life-style
of the family members in Mexico is more visible and somewhat more opulent
than that of those in the United States, it is for the most part unpretentious. The vast majority of the organization's wealth is invested in ranches,
land, dairies, apartments, and the financial institutions of Durango and
Mexico's western region.
The younger members of the family (Reyes Herrera-Nevarez , Adalberto
Herrera-Medina, Jose Herrera-Manquero, and their relatives) run the distribution and wholesaling end of the business in Chicago. 32 Their neighborhood bases are in the Roseland, Pilsen, Blue Island, and Aurora sections
of the city. They are also responsible for transshipment to retailing
groups in Louisville, Detroit, Boston, Springfield (Massachusetts), Hartford, New York City, Philadelphia, and Puerto Rico.
Efficient organizational management is maintained by some 26 executive
level directors, and a vast array of "field representatives" in a number
of American cities. 33 This network is held together through the Herrera
organization's Chicago "offices" and through constant communications and
trips back to the organization's headquarters in Durango.
Two aspects of the Herreras' operations are of interest to us in
this paper: first, their transportation and transshipment of heroin
through the borderlands; second, their return shipment to the Mexican economy of large sums of untaxed United States currency. This second aspect of
the Herreras' operation is particularly significant as it has been ignored
for so long by students of the borderlands. The traditional wisdom is that
drug trafficking crime matrices, particularly those from less developed
nations, such as Mexico, are unimportant from the perspective of political
economy because the bulk of the profits occur in the recipient nation, and
only small sums return to the producing nation. Indeed, it has been argued
that even the money that does return to the less developed illicit drug
producing country is of little concern for it will be spent on expensive
luxuries and advanced technology products, which are produced in the hightechnology drug-consuming nations. 34 We challenge this conventional view,
for the data from the Herrera organization indicate, as we shall show,
that under certain organizational conditions a large percentage of the profits rapidly leave the illicit drug consuming country and return to the producing nation. Second, we find little comfort in the view that these "drugdollars" will quickly find their way back into the U.S. economy. We note
that there are other advanced technology nations (for example, Japan and
West Germany) producing goods that compete for these narcodollars. And more
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important, we note that the producing nations themselves offer attractive
investment possibilities. We see little reason why a group like the Herreras
should r e turn their drug-dollars to the United States through the purchase of
New York City office buildings , or Beverly Hills estates, when the ranches,
dair ies , and resort developments of Mexico offer attractive returns. From
t his point of view, we see drug trafficking as having an important effect on
North/South relations . And, it may well be that the argument we are presenting for Mexico could be made regarding the Colombian drug-dollars as well.
The DEA estimates that the Herrera organization imports 0.37 tons (746
lbs.) of pure heroin into the United States each year. This amounts to some
8.14 tons of "stepped on" five percent heroin for retail. According to the
Drug Enforcement Agency, this amounts to one-third of the total Chicago market for this drug. 35
There are a number of ways to move illicit contraband across a border.
In the heroin trafficking matrix, the most common way is for a half-ounce or
ounce of heroin to be carried in a rubber condom and held inside the mouth
or other or if i ce s by huma n "burros " or "mul e s . " This is perhaps the most
common means of transp ort in t he borderland s thems elves. One New Mexico
traf fi cking group had s eventy- six such human " mules ' c rossing the border
every month. After delivery of the heroin, they would return to Mexico via
the Immigration and Naturalization Service bus, courtesy of our undocumented
workers program . 37
The Herreras' operations are too large and too far from the border to
permit the use of this method. Their preferred method of transshipment is
the "Durango drive-shaft," and the compartmentalized gas tank, although they
have used door panels and other hiding places as well. 38 The "Durango
drive-shaft " is a sleevelike device of the Herreras ' invention, which surrounds the vehicle drive-shaft and can contain up to several kilos of heroin. The compartmentalized gasoline tank is simply that, a subdivided vehicle gasoline tank, one part holding the fuel, the other several kilos of
heroin. Once these devices are travel-dirty, they are hard to distinguish
or detect.
To bring their heroin across the border, the Herrera organization uses
driver-"mules" who take a loaded vehicle from Durango to Chicago in 49 hours
of straight-through driving . At the border crossing- -the Herrera group,
according to one DEA map, prefers the El Paso, Del Rio, Eagle Pass, and
Laredo check points--the mule will be observed by a Herrera representative
to make sure he crosses undetected. 39 The U.S. Customs estimates, they are
only able to interdict some two percent of the heroin crossing the Southwes
border, so this phase of the Herreras operations usually proceeds smoothly. 0
On arriving in Chicago the mule will be paid $800 to $1,000 for his work. In
this manner the senior Herreras traffic their heroin across the borderlands.

4

The second part of the Herreras' operations that is of interest involves
the movement of United States (untaxed) currency back to Mexico. Much of
this cash is returned by southbound "mules" or by higher level members of
the organization who are returning home. One such Herrera family member was
arrested just as he was about to leave Chicago carrying $94,000; another was
stopped at the border and $217,970 found in a compartmentalized gas tank. 4l
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Because of these problems, and other problems of "slippage" in sending cash
back to Durango, the Herreras have turned to a different and unique method.
They simply use the local poverty neighborhood currency exchanges (check
cashing out lets) to send money orders back to Durango. A recent Congressiona l study found that between June 1976 and July 1977, the Herreras sent
$625,906 from one South Halsted Street exchange to a bank in Durango. Between January 1975 and June 1977 they had sent $1,253,076 south of the border from another exchange. Indeed, in a single day they moved $125,000 in
money orders through one poverty neighborhood exchange. 42
In light of law enforcement interest in this method of funds transfer,
the Herreras appear to have turned to Western Union to send their excess cash
to Mexico. In 1976 they sent $270,680 to Durango through Western Union. In
the first five months of 1977, as the government studied the currency exchange transfers, this jumped to $351,650. 43
In total, the DEA and other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agenc i es could trace just under $2 million ($1,878,323 . 23) from the exchanges
and Wester n Union dur ing the pe riod they s tudied . They estimate that this
is probably about one perc ent o f t he t ota l ( $100-$200 million) cash transferr ed to Mexico by the Herrera organization annually . 44 We b e lieve that the
$200 million figure is too high. Our analysis of the economics of the
Herreras' operation indicates that $100 million is more nearly correct.
The DEA estimates that it cost the Herrera organization between $5,500
and $6 , 500 to get a kilo of heroin from the opium poppy fields of the Sierra
Madre to the streets of Chicago. 45 The difference in these figur e s depends
on whether they are bringing in ten percent heroin ($5,500)or five percent
heroin ($6,500). As the Herrera group are primarily wholesalers, they are
content to sell a kilo for $27,500, even though they could work for higher
prices. 46 Given their costs, they net $21,000 or $22,000, depending on the
level of purity of the kilo. Chicago Police Department intelligence indicates that the Herreras have an organizational norm which states that a
minimu~ of $17,000 is to be returned home to Mexico out of every kilo wholesaled. 47 By working through these numbers, we can better estimate how much
the Herrera group is likely to send across the border back to Mexico. This
analysis is presented in Table 3.
See Table Three
The government's investigation of the Chicago currency e x changes , and
DEA and U.S. Customs border stops over six months in 1976- 1977 , only account
for about $2.1 million moving south. If we accept the notion that as border
screens are designed to keep things out , and not to prevent things from leaving, and the fact the Customs only stops ten percent of total contraband coming
into the United States, it is possible that much larger shipments of untaxed
cash are moving out. 48 Certainly our analysis would suggest that the movement of over $100 million to Mexico by the Herrera organization is feasible .
How many of the other major heroin trafficking groups that op erate in the
borderlands return similar proportions of their profits to Mexico is unknown.
To examine further the impact of drug trafficking on North/South relations,
we now turn to the political economy of drugs south of the border.
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IV
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO.
THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION: PART II
In Mexico a federal policeman is paid between $150 and $200 a month in
salary. Given the contraband on the border, it is not surprising that mordidas,
the payments of gratuities or bribes for the nonenforcement of law, are commonplace. The Herreras' organization obviously can make use of this, so perhaps
we should not be surprised when Marshall Carter in her study of El Paso informs
us of one relatively new Mexican border officer who has over $150,000 in U.S.
bank accounts. 49 Obviously, if one is in the right place whether it is on
the United States or the Mexican side of the border, one can earn significant
sums by looking the other way. Thus the first impacts that the Herreras have
south of the border, as probably they do on the U.S. side of the line, is in
bribery and corruption of the guardians of that border. Unfortunately, due
to the lack of systematic data, we cannot analyze this and can only note the
need for regularized study.
Farther south, the campesinos of the Sierra Madre can, with luck, earn
$100 a year from the beans and corn they raise, If one adds to this the
value of their labor, and the fruit of their livestock and family's efforts,
this figure can be increased to $400 per year. The poor, often landless
campesino, by planting an illicit 2.5 acres on government mountain wilderness, can aid his family. The sowing and cultivation of opium with his corn,
or on some rugged mountainside, can also greatly increase the campesino's
income. At the same time, the camQesino has little understanding of the
serious implications that his efforts to improve his lot have on some other
distant society.50 By planting opium poppies on 2~ acres, a campesino can
earn from $2,000 to $4,000 or more annually, depending on the number of crops
he can harvest. 5l
See Table Four
In Table 4 we present several scenarios that estimate the Herrera organization's
contribution in terms of local acreage planted in the Durango area. This table
is based on a number of premises, which we will do our best to explain. As
this is a secondary analysis, lacking access to either the Herrera account
books or DEA intelligence files, we have used the best common-sense intelligence possible.
The different yield figures and alternative scenarios in Table 4 provide
us with the range of acreage the Herrera organization must have in cultivation
to produce their supply for the Chicago market. The varying yield formulas
could reflect the varying soil or climatological conditions of the Sierra
Madre region, or new learning on the part of DEA. Since it is impossible, using secondary source materials to know the answer to this, or to know the
exact number of Herrera acres affected by the TRIZO eradication program, we
simply present all the alternative likely yield and eradication scenarios.
Obviously, if all the Herrera acreage had been eradicated by the TRIZO program, they would be out of business. We assume, therefore, that they have
the capacity to achieve at least one harvest. It may be that they had other
acreage planted that was completely eradicated. The largest figure in the table
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(2,035 acres) indicates what the Herrera group must cultivate to meet their
tonnage under the poorest yield conditions. The smallest figure (185 acres)
indicates the least amount of acres they need cultivated under the best
conditions.
It is likely that the Herrera organization receives their opium
gum fr om some amount of acreage within this . extreme range.
If the typical campesino family in the Sierra Madre cultivates 2.5 acres
of opium poppies as DEA reports, then the Herrera organization provides employment for anywhere from 68 to 756 campesino families.
This work, however, is
highly labor intensive and, at harvest time, many more farm laborers would be
employed. Indeed, DEA estimates that it takes 20 laborers to harvest the gum
from one acre of opium poppies. 53 If this is so (and because of serial planting, all acreage does not mature at the same time, so that the average field
crew can only harvest two acres), then anywhere from 680 to 7,460 farm laborers could receive seasonal employment from the Herrera's illicit entrepreneurship. This is admittedly a crude "guestimate," but it indicates the range of
basic employment opportunities provided by the Herrera group in the Sierra
Madre region.
Using the various s cenar i o s pre s ent e d in Table 4, it is possible to
d e rive some i ncome estimates for the campesino f a mi lies who engage in the
cultivation of this illicit crop. Table 5 presents these income estima tes.
We assume in this effort that some of their income will go to pay harvest
See Table Five
labor and thus this income will be more widely dispersed in the Sierra Madre
· communities.
This analysis reflects the impact that the Herrera organization would have
on the income of the campesino population of the Sierra Madre region. We suspect, however, that the TRIZO program has probably displaced much of this
cultivation to other areas and states east and south of the TRIZO program
boundaries. 54 Whatever the case, it is evident from Table 5 that the cultivation of opium can greatly increase campesino income, and that any program to
limit the cultivation of opium poppies must seek to provide alternative income
possibilities and incentives for the campesinos.
Indeed, because campesino
earnings are so low, any extra income is likely to be quickly consumed with
attendant multiplier effects on the merchandising and retailing sectors of the
regional and local economy.
The Herrera organization, through their illicit entrepreneurship in the
borderlands, is putting, we estimate, nearly $1.5 million into the campesino
economy, which is likely to have a "spending" multiplier effect several times
that amount. 55 Such economic "pump-priming" is likely to have strong effects
on the campesino economy. Through poppy cultivation a campesino can, for
better or worse, move from a subsistence income and barter to participation in
the cash economy. From dependence on the burro, he can achieve dependence on
the pickup or four-wheel-drive vehicle.
Indeed, the booming borderlands
business in stolen trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles moving south across
the border underscores this transportation change. C.C. Benson of the National
Auto Theft Bureau estimates that some 10,000 vehicles stolen in the United
States each year end up in Mexico. 56 The majority of those vehicles stay in
the Mexican borderlands, particularly the drug-producing regions.
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While the Herrera's contribution to the campesino economy is large compared
with earnings from traditional production and labor, it represents only 1.5 percent of the total untaxed u.s. currency income they bring into the Republic of
Mexico. Their annual investments, during the 1970s, of over $100 million a
year in land, ranches, dairies, apartments, resort developments, and financial
institutions is a tremendous, if illicit, boon to the Mexican economy. In
light of the consequences of addition, and its multiplier effects of crime and
human misery on the United States side of the border, this is not a pleasant
conclusion to come to. But from the point of viewfQ~a less developed nation
and its economy, so long as the illicit drug production and trafficking is for
the export market, there are few incentives to eliminate totally this production.
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Mexican government has been as
cooperative as it has in assisting the United States to eliminate opium and
marijuana fields and bring major traffickers to justice. In 1978 Mexico spent
some $40 million in these efforts. 57 This is far more than a token gesture
and indicative of the strong desires the Mexican government has for amicable
and close relations with the United States. 58 Given the shifting trafficking
patterns to other less developed countries, however, this analysis of profits
and incentives is something that our policy makers must recognize and ponder.

V

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO: PART III
ESTIMATES OF HEROIN PRODUCTION
AND DRUG-DOLLAR RETURNS
TO THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
DEA authorities estimate that there are six separate organizations
that control production and smuggling of an estimated 10 tons of pure
heroin into the United States each year. 59
Governor James Thompson of Illinois made the above statement in February
1978 at the opening of congressional hearings into drug trafficking in the
Chicago area. ~fuile we agree that there probably are six major organizations
engaged in this drug trafficking across the southwestern borderlands, we
believe that the "10 tons of pure heroin" is either exaggerated or out of date.
In order to get a better estimate of the total amount of heroin that
could be produced in Mexico, and, in turn, imported into the United States,
we must turn to the eradication and yield estimates of the U.S. government.
In mid-October 1976, the DEA reported that it had destroyed some 38,500 fields
of opium poppies, which it estimated made up between 85 percent and 90 percent
of the total acreage in Mexico. 60 In 1978, DEA presented summary figures,
which showed that in 1977 some 21,769 acres that could have yielded some 8,567
kilos of pure heroin were eradicated. 61 This conversion is based on a DEA
formula, which estimates that 2,471 acres yields 10 kilos of opium gum,
equivalent to one kilogram of pure heroin (2.2 lbs.). Either DEA's math is
in error or they have additional unstated assumptions regarding yields, for
using their formula and numbers we find a yield (see Table 6) of 8,809 kilos.
See Table Six
If the 21,769 acres eradicated were the total acreage in Mexico and if

-12-

they had been unmolested for one or both harvests, anywhere from 8.5 to g 4.6
metric tons of pure heroin would have been available for export to the United
States. Instead, the TRIZO eradication program removed much of this tonnage
from t he market. The acreage eradicated, however, is not likely to be the
total a creage planted in opium poppies, only SDme percentage of it.
It we
assume that in 1977 they were able to destroy the same percentage as in 1976
(i.e., 85 percent to 90 percent) then, using the lower percentage figure,
DEA and the Mexican government destroyed 21,769 acres out of a total acreage
of 25,610 in poppy cultivation. This means that there were some 3,341 acres
missed by the TRIZO program.
If this acreage produced one harvest it could
yield, using the 2.471 acres yields one kilo formula, some 1,336 kilos of
pure heroin, or 1.3 tons. If totally unmolested, this acreage could yield
2.6 tons for export. This estimate of between 1.3 and 2.6 metric tons available to the United States market appears more reasonable than Governor
Thompson's "10 tons." It also appears to be more in line with the 0.37 metric tons that DEA estimates is the Herrera organization's share of the U.S.
market. The large drop in the purity of heroin available on the streets of
this nation, from 5.1 percent in the beginning of 1978 to 3.5 percent in
March of 1 979 , also corroborates that the amount of p u re hero in ava i lable
for the market has d e cl i ned c ons iderab ly.62
If the range of from 1.3 to 2.6 metric tons of
for export can be considered to be "ballpark," then
the likely drug-dollar flow back to Mexico might be
group behaved like the Herrera organization. Table

pure heroin available
we can estimate what
if every trafficking
7 presents this analysis.

See Table Seven
From this analysis we can see that if every Mexican heroin trafficking
group behaved like the Herrera organization is said to behave, then anywhere
from $420 million to $1.5 billion dollars in U.S. currency could flow into
the Mexican economy from the heroin trade.
It is unlikely that other trafficking organizations behave like the Herrera group, although we would note
that Alberto Sicilia Falcon, who headed a large CUliacan-Tijuana to Los
Angeles trafficking network, is said to have returned some $3.6 million a
week to Mexico when his organization was operating at peak efficiency.63
Given the large amount of drug-dollar flows back into the Mexican
economy as well as the extremely large dollar amount of the estimated possible drug-dollar flows, it is surprising that the Mexican government has
been as cooperative in eradicating the opium poppy crop as they have been
in the past several years. Even with government cooperation, however, one
must not forget the persistence and tenacity of human beings to improve
their lot in life. For the poor campesino the growing of opium poppies
will remain an extremely attractive proposition given his limited alternatives.
In the fall of 1977, the DEA conducted a helicopter survey of Zone 06
north of Culiacan in Sinaloa State. Here the fields of opium poppies have
been the targets of eradication programs since the "gran campana" of 1945.
Yet the survey found that of 1,055 fields flown over, some 608 had been
destroyed, 270 had opium poppies growing, and 177 were in preparation for
poppy cultivation. 64 The survey noted:
"the large fields that had been
destroyed were abandoned.
The fields are smaller, dispersed . . . hidden
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among traditional crops . . . under high foliage.,,65 For more than thirtytwo years this area of Sinaloa State has been under surveillance and subjected to poppy eradication efforts. Yet, the poppies are still being
grown. To close, we would note that if just the 177 fields in preparation
were each only one acre and left unmolested, they would more than supply
the Herrera organization's share of the United States market.

VI
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have in this paper examined one small aspect of the
political and economic relationships that make up the complexity of the
borderlands, the heroin trafficking crime matrix and its effects on the
United States and Mexico. We have found that some forms of borderlands
drug trafficking organization appear to provide an illicit and untaxed
form of foreign aid for a less developed economy, aid that, we noted,
reaches into very different sectors and levels within an economy as does
the formal foreign aid program. Law enforcement, whether federal or local, cannot be expected ever fully to accomplish its mission so long as
such political and economic incentives to trafficking continue to exist.
Finally, in terms of future research, much needs to be done. First,
we--academics and scholars--need to work more closely with the State
Department and law enforcement intelligence working in this field. We
need access to data, and they need an outside, objective research and
analysis of their formulas, data collection, and verification techniques
if they are to serve the Congress and the nation. There is a need for onsite research in Mexico, and other nations, and the development of cooperative projects and ties with our counterparts in the academy and drug
law enforcement of those nations. There is also a need for comparative
research studying the structure and function of trafficking organizations
and cash flows and their effects on a nation's economy.
Comparative
studies between Mexico and other Latin American drug-producing nations
and the Caribbean area would be a good place to start. Most of all we
need to recognize the multifaceted nature of this policy problem and its
effects. We hope this research can provide one example of a beginning,
and that we and others can progress, learn, and develop a more sophisti~
cated understanding of all the aspects of drug trafficking as both a domestic and international policy problem.
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TABLE 1. DRUG SMUGGL ING SEIZURES AT THE SAN YSIDRO-TIJUANA CROSSING
(FY 1960 THROUGH MAY 1968)
Drug Seizures by Type and ' Amount
Fiscal Year
(June 30-July 1)

Marijuana
(lbs. )

Heroin
(ozs. )

Dangerous Drugs
(1,000 units)

1960-1961

393

87

21

1961-1962

1,904

42

14

1962-1963

924

94

17

1963-1964

3,900

240

530

1964-1965

6,331

156

74

1965-1966

3,121

174

102

1966-1967

16,133

195

542

1967-(May) 1968

37,679

441

947

Source: Michael Logan, "Smugg ling Drugs and Narcotics through the San Ysidro Station"
in J. Price, ed., Tijuana ' 68 (mi~eo). August, 1968.

I
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TABLE 2. MEXICAN HEROIN TRAFFICKING TO THE UNITED STATES
IN THE 1970S AS INDICATED BY MEXICAN HEROIN'S SHARE OF
THE U.S. MARKET

Market
Percentage
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
___ 50%

50%
40%
38%
30%
20%

20%

10%

1972
Source:

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

See footnote 22.

Note: Although Mexico's share of the market in the late
1970s was substantial, purity levels had dropped significantly as a result of the eradication programs.
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TABLE 3. AN ANALYSI S OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEROIN TRAFFICKING:
PART I. THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION*

Imported:

0.37 tons pure he r oin = 8.14 tons (16,280 lbs.) 5% heroin
8.14 tons yields 7 ,384 5% kilos.

Wholesale price:

$27,500 a ki lo x 7,384 kilos = $203,060,000 Gross Profit.

Profit Minus Costs:

Costs:

$ 6,500 per 5% kilo

7,384 k ilos x $6,500 cost = $47,996,000 Gross Cost.
(" 1

Net Total Profit:

=$155,064,000

DEA Estimates 75%-80% Returne d to Mexico:

=$116,284,000 at 75% returned.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:

CHICAGO POLICE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Total kilos:

7,384

Organizational Norm:

$17,00 0 minimum returned to Mexico from each kilo.

Net return to Mexico: $125, 528, 000
*The authors have converted metric tons and hectares used by DEA intelligence
throughout this pape r.

C' ~

I

TABLE 5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DRUG TRAFFICKING:
PART II.
CAMPESINO INCOME ESTIMATES FROM OPIUM POppy CULTIVATION FOR
THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION VERSUS PLANTING TRADITIONAL CROPS

CAMPESINO INCOME ESTIMATES FROM:
SCENARIOS
(See Table 4)

Opium Poppy
Cultivation

Scenario A

$ 1,628,000

$ 325,600

Scenario B

$

789,000

$ 105,200

Scenario C

$

272,000

$

Traditional Crops
and Labors

2 9,600

Computation Rationale.
Scenarios A and C are based on the
most and least acreage requirements of Table 4. Scenario B
is based on an average of the three different yield figures
in that table. Note: We assume that the campenios would
plant the same acreage of traditional crops under normal
conditions as they do acres under the adverse TRIZO conditions. This is probably an unreasonable assumption.
In
which case their earnings for traditional crops would always
be close to the Scenario C case.
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TABLE 6. ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEROIN
TRAFFICKING VARIOUS YIELD ESTIMA'TES OF DEA IS 1977 ERADICATED
ACREAGE (21,769 ACRES)

YIELD FORMULAS

PURE HEROIN TONNAGE FROM:

PURE HEROIN

1.

ONE HARVEST

TWO HARVESTS

(2.2 Ibs. )
DEAls math yield (8,567 kilos)

8.5

17.0

(8,809 kilos)

8.8

17.6

4.0

8.0

17.3

34.6

2.471 acres yield
1 kilo

Our math yield
2.

2.5 acres yield
1 pound pure heroin

3.

1 acre yields
1. 75 Ibs. pure heroin

Note:

Yield formulas, see footnoes 52 and 61.

-

2L~. -

TABLE 7. ·ESTIMATED DRUG-DOLLAR FLOWS BACK TO THE MEXICAN
ECONOMY FROM TOTAL HEROIN PRODUCTION AND HERRERA ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

Low estimate
of total tonnage:

1.3 tons pure heroin

=

26,720 kilos 5% heroin

High estimate
of total tonnage:

2.6 tons pure heroin

=

53,440 kilos 5% heroin

HERRERA ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

LOW ESTIMATE
CASH FLOWS

HIGH ESTIMATE
CASH FLOWS

Wholesale Price ($27,500 a kilo)

$734,800,000

$1,469,600,000

Gross Costs

$ 1 73 ,5 80 ,000

$

$561,120,000

$1,122,240,000

$420,840,000

$

( $6 , 500 a k ilo)
Total Net Profit

Estimated Return to Mexico (75%)

347,360,000

841,680,000

Using Chicago Police Intelligence formula the figures would be
$525,453,000 and $1,050,906,000 returned to Mexico.

- 25-

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

LA TIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

1.

Guess, George M. "Bureaucracy and the Unmanaged Forest Commons in Costa Rica."
December 1979.

2.

Lupsha, Peter A. , and Kip Schlegel. "The Political Economy of Drug Trafficking: The
Herrera Organization (Mexico and the United States)." November 1980.

3.

Gregory, Peter. "Employment, Unemployment, and Underemployment in Latin America."
March 1981.

4.

Levy, James, and Nick Mills, Jr. "The Challenge to Democratic Reformism in Ecuador."
June 1981.

5.

Gregory, Peter. "Legal Minimum Wages as an Instrument of Social Policy in Less
Developed Countries, with Special Reference to Costa Rica." July 198 1.

6.

Diez-Canedo, Juan. "Undocumented Migration to the United States : A New Perspective."
August 1981 .

7.

Sabloff, Paula L. W. "Caciquismo in Post-Revolutionary Mexican Ej ido-Grant
Communities." September 1981.

8.

Gregory, Peter. "Economic Development and the Labor Market in Mex ico." November
1981 .

9.

Earley, Stephen. "Arms and Politics in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 1948-1981 ." May 1982.

10.

Wessman, James W. "Peasants, Capitalists, and the State: Mexico's Changing Agricultural
Policies and the 'Hungarian Project'." May 1982.

11.

Conniff, Michael L. "Black Labor on a White Canal: West Indians in Panama, 19041980." May 1983 .

12.

Froehlich, Jeffery W., and Karl H. Schwerin. "Conservation and Indi ge nous Human Land
Use in the Rio Platano Watershed, Northeast Honduras." June 1983.

13 .

Bales, Fred V. "Comparing Media Use and Political Orientation Among Squatter Settlers
of Two Latin American Countries." June 1983.

(

14.

Sab10ff, Jeremy A., Patricia A. McAnany, Bernd Fahmel Beyer, Tomas Gallareta N., Signa
L. Larralde, and LuAnn Wandsnider. "Ancient Maya Settlement Patterns at the Site of
Sayil, Puuc Region, Yucatan, Mexico: Initial Reconnaissance (1983)." January 1984.

15.

Santley, Robert S., Ponciano Ortiz Ceballos, Thomas W. Killion, Philip J. Arnold, and
Janet M. Kerley. "Final Field Report of the Matacapan Archaeological Project: The 1982
Season." June 1984.

16.

Morris, Nancy E. "Canto porque es necesario cantar: The New Song Movement in Chile,
1973-1983." July 1984.

17.

Sabloff, Jeremy A., Gair Tourtellot, Bernd Fahmel Beyer, Patricia A. McAnany, Diana
Christensen, Sylviane Boucher, and Thomas R. Killion. "Settlement and Community
Patterns at Sayil, Yucatan, Mexico: The 1984 Season." April 1985.

18.

Brajer, Victor. "An Analysis oflnflation in the Small, Open Economy of Costa Rica."
June 1986.

19.

Ashley, John M. "The Social and Environmental Effects of the Palm-Oil fndustry in the
Oriente of Ecuador." October 1987.

20.

Hidalgo, Margarita. "Perceptions of Spanish-English Code-Switching in Juarez, Mexico."
March 1988.

21.

Arnold, Philip J III. "Ceramic Production and Consumption in the Sien·a de los Tuxtlas,
Veracruz, Mexico." June 1988.

22.

Gregory, Peter. "Undocumented Migration to the United States: Can the Flow Be
Stemmed?" May 1989.

23.

White, Thomas U. "Mexican Immigrant Labor: An Alternative Analysis and Policy
Proposal." November 1989.

24.

Lipski , John M. "On the Non-Creole Basis for Afro-Caribbean Spanish." February 1993.

25.

Lamadrid, Enrique R. "Treasures of the Mama Huaca : Oral Tradition and Ecological
Consciousness in Chinchaysuyu." May 1993.

26.

Lipski, John M. "New Perspective on Afro-Dominican Spanish: the Haitian
Contribution," May 1994.

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
1.

Remmer, Karen L. "The Chilean Military under Authoritation Rule, 1973- I 987." March
1988.

2.

Davidson, Russ "A Description of Rare and Important Medina Imprints in the University
of New Mexico Library." May 1988.

3.

Martz, John D. "The Military in Ecuador: Policies and Politics of Authoritarian Rule."
June 1988.

4.

Torres, Victor F. The Canudos War Collection. May 1990.

5.

Claire-Lise Benaud and Oscar E. Delepiani. OAXACA: A Critical Bibliography of Rare
and Specialized Materials in the University of New Mexico's General Library. March 1992.

SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS
1.

Davidson, Russ and Joiner, Carol. "Mexico in the UNM Libraries : A Guide To Special
Materials and Older Works." Spring 1986.

2.

Kjeldgaard, Linda, editor. "Encuentro: A Columbian Quincentenary Quarterly". 19851989.

3.

Kjeldgaard, Linda, editor. "Encounters: A Quincentenary Review. 1989-.

3.

Landmann, Robert S., editor. "The Problem of the Undocumented Worker." Spring 1980.

Research and occasional papers are $5.00 each from the Latin American Institute; University of
New Mexico; 801 Yale NE; Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131; 505 277-2961. Special
Publication prices quoted upon request.

To comply with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, UNM provides this publication in
alternative formats. If you have special needs and require an auxiliary aid or service please
contact Theo R Crevenna; Deputy Director; Latin American Institute; 80 I Yale NE ;
Albuquerque, NM 87131 ; 505 277-2961; fax 505277-5989; Internet
CREVENNA@ BOOTES.UNM.EDU

